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THE MARKET DEFENSE
Sharon Rabin–Margalioth*
I. INTRODUCTION
Women too often encounter the argument that pay disparity is the
outcome of market forces, not sex discrimination. Salary differentials are
attributed to individual pay demands, bargaining effectiveness, external
counteroffers, and prior salaries. These are just a few examples of market
justifications that employers raise to explain why similar workers
performing the same job are compensated differently. The market defense
posits that as long as there is a wedge between employees’ reservation
wages1 and their marginal productivity, wages can be set anywhere in
between. Any variance in compensation between two similarly productive
employees performing the same job is the result of differences in the
division of the employment contractual surplus in two separate
employment relationships.
As union membership continues to decline, and the percentage of
employees covered by collective bargaining agreements and other fairly
rigid compensation schemes also declines, most employees face the task of
bargaining over wages on their own.2 Granting deference to market
explanations in this individual bargaining setting will hinder the future
quest for gender pay equality. Women, on average, tend to be less

* Professor of Law, Radzyner School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya
(Israel), and Global Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. The reservation wage is the minimal wage for which a given employee is willing to
perform a specific job.
2. In 2008, union members accounted for only 12.4% of employed wage, and only
13.7% of salary workers were covered by a union or an employee association contract. In
the private sector, only 7.6% of workers were union members, and 8.4% were covered by
some collective bargaining agreement. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
USDL 09-0095, UNION MEMBERS IN 2008, tbls. 1 & 3, (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01282009.pdf. This data demonstrates
that nine out of ten workers are not represented with relation to compensation decisions.
Rather, they are either negotiating individually the terms and conditions of their
employment or are unilaterally offered employment contracts with no formal or informal
bargaining.
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effective bargainers, and in some cases, market justifications are a pretext
to sex discrimination.3
To prevail in a compensation discrimination claim under traditional
discrimination theory, a plaintiff must identify a causal link between
membership in a protected group, such as being a woman, and her
relatively low compensation compared to a male co-worker.4 If the
employer argues successfully that market forces cause this disparity, the
fact that a woman may be paid less than a man for performing the same
work is not sufficient to prevail. The market justification is thus presented
to overcome the causal link between gender and compensation.
This Article argues that, usually, market justifications for pay disparity
in equal-pay-for-equal-work litigation should be rejected. I do not discuss
the controversial theory of equal-pay-for-comparable-worth, according to
which cross-occupational demands for equal pay are made based on a claim
that the intrinsic worth of the compared occupations or jobs are equivalent,
although the external market places different value on the jobs at question.5
My rejection of the market defense pertains only to individuals performing
the same job.
The Article then takes on the more ambitious project of proposing an
alternative model of gender discrimination, which is not restricted to
causation. Anti-discrimination mandates outlaw employment practices that
discriminate against women because of their sex. I argue that, in the
limited case of equal pay litigation, we should abandon this causation
requirement. The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”)6 claims that an
alternative model of equality should be endorsed, which would restrict an
employer’s ability to defend differential wages for equal work to cases
where he can present evidence that individual ability or productivity
considerations support the disputed pay disparity. In other words, the
traditional causation model is based on an irrelevancy test. Discrimination
occurs when an employment action is based on an irrelevant factor, such as
sex. The other paradigm, which I term “partial causation,” asks whether
the decision-maker has confined himself to a checklist of relevant factors.7
Whenever a female employee is compensated at a lower rate than a
3. See infra notes 29-68 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
5. I reference briefly some of the literature and leading cases based on comparable
worth claims only to better understand the treatment of the market defense in the context of
equal pay for equal work. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
7. I term this relevancy test as a “partial causation” model because the goal is to
decrease the gender wage gap, not any unjustified pay inequality. To trigger review, the
model insists that you target pay disparity between two workers of opposite sex. The
causation requirement is relaxed only regarding the motivation or statistical impact of the
practice.
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comparable male employee for the same work, it triggers the obligation to
inquire whether this can be justified by one of the authorized grounds listed
explicitly in the Equal Pay Act.
The distinction between the two models of discrimination parallels the
distinction between two possible regimes that govern the employment
relationship regarding job security and the ability of employers to fire their
employees without cause. The “employment at will rule,” which is the
default rule in most jurisdictions, allows an employer to terminate an
employee for any reason — a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at
all.8 Specific exceptions to the at will rule are carved out,9 but other than
these explicit motivations, the employer can base his decision on any
factor. The employment at will rule mirrors the causation model of
discrimination. Parties to the employment relationship can opt-out of the at
will rule and institute a termination regime based on “just cause.”10 Under
a “just cause” rule, the employer’s discretion in termination decisions is
limited by an identified list of authorized reasons to terminate employees,
usually relating to performance, discipline, and economic needs. A “just
cause” regime is similarly structured to the proposal of identifying
discriminatory practices by examining whether the employer was guided by
one or more of the factors authorized for determining compensation.11
The gender wage gap is a complex phenomenon. There are at least
three causation issues that remain unsettled in the literature discussing the
gender wage gap. First, disagreement surrounds the identification of the
variables responsible for the wage gap.12 Second, the relative significance
of various contributing factors is disputed.13 Third, the underlying
8. See Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (defining the employment at will rule).
9. See Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and U.S.
Labor Markets, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74, 75 (2000) (listing specific exceptions to the
employment at will rule).
10. Montana is currently the only jurisdiction that opted for a mandatory “just cause”
regime. Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2901 to -914 (2009). In the unionized sector, however, most collective bargaining
agreements incorporate job security protection clauses, which limit employer’s prerogative
to terminate employees according to a restricted list of events.
11. I thank Cindy Estlund for pointing out the similarity between job security regimes
and the two possibilities of conceptualizing discriminatory practice.
12. See Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Discrimination: Empirical Evidence
from the United States, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 316, 316 (1987) (reviewing theories used in
determining the extent of discrimination; Alan Manning & Joanna Swaffield, The Gender
Gap in Early-Career Wage Growth, 118 ECON. J. 983, 983 (2008) (exploring reason for the
UK’s gender gap in early-career wage growth).
13. See Stephanie Boraas & William M. Rodgers III, How Does Gender Play a Role in
the Earnings Gap? An Update, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 2003, at 9, 9 (noting that
although the existence of the gender pay gap is well documented, the factors that contribute
to it are still debated); Dan A. Black, Amelia M. Haviland, Seth G. Sanders & Lowell J.
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relationship between some factors and past and present societal
discrimination is also often questioned.14 In this climate of empirical
uncertainty, adherence to a definition of discrimination, which requires the
plaintiff to articulate causality between the employer’s seemingly neutral
and market-guided compensation policies and sex, will frustrate most
claims of pay discrimination. Broad interpretation of what constitutes a
valid defense may undermine the EPA’s goal of eliminating unjustified
wage disparities. Some defenses, especially variants of the market force
defense, are actually discriminatory practices since they disadvantage
women as a group.
The courts overlooked the opportunity to interpret the EPA as
restricting employer’s discretion to disparately compensate employees of
opposite sexes to a checklist of authorized factors relating to productivity
and ability.15 Currently, EPA jurisprudence is under-theorized. In a series
of decisions, the courts interpreted the EPA to emulate Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196416 models of discrimination, which are based on
strong causation.17 Employers were able to make use of the market defense
to sever the causal link between sex and compensation. However, in
January 2009, Congress passed H.R. 12, the Paycheck Fairness Act.18 This
bill, amending the EPA, clarifies that the scope of the employer’s
affirmative defense is quite narrow and in fact, is limited to considerations
closely related to individual ability and productivity. If this important
legislation becomes law, the market defense will be eliminated altogether
from the EPA framework of discrimination.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II explores what employers
Taylor, Gender Wage Disparities among the Highly Educated, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 630,
631 (2008) (discussing the widely different regression specifications and different data sets
used in the literature studying the gender wage gap); Marianne Bertrand, Claudia Goldin &
Lawrence E. Katz, Dynamics of the Gender Gap for Young Professionals in the Financial
and Corporate Sectors 3-4(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14681,
2009), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/goldin/files/Dynamics.pdf
(identifying three proximate factors that may explain the large and rising gender gap in
earnings).
14. See Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the “Family Gap” in Pay for Women with
Children, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 137 (1998) (examining the wage differential between women
with and without children); Daniel Fischel & Edward Lazear, Comparable Worth and
Discrimination in Labor Markets, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 891 (1986) (providing a critique of
comparable worth that does not depend on acceptance of the market price as dispositive).
15. See infra notes 126-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial
oversight.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006). Title VII prohibits employment-related
discrimination on the basis of five group membership classifications: race, color, national
origin, sex, and religion.
17. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B.
18. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-12. The bill is pending in the Senate.
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assert when offering a market defense to discriminatory compensation
claims. It offers the normative analysis of why the market defense should
be rejected. It draws on the growing body of research demonstrating
gender differences in negotiation skills, self entitlement, and competitive
behavior. Part III explains how traditional models of discrimination, based
on causation, are ill-equipped to deal with pay disparities resulting from
market behavior of individual employees. Part IV develops the argument
that we should abandon the causation requirement for pay disparity claims,
substituting it with a checklist of relevant factors which will govern
compensation decisions. It then explains why the EPA was interpreted as
embracing a causation model, although its structure clearly indicates a
departure from traditional discrimination models. Part IV also discusses
the Paycheck Fairness Act. If passed, this bill will settle the ambiguity
surrounding the reach of the market defense.19 Part V concludes with a
response to criticism voiced against eliminating the market defense from
the EPA.
II. WHY ARE SOME MARKET JUSTIFICATIONS TO THE GENDER WAGE GAP
DISCRIMINATORY?

A. What Are Market Justifications?
A market explanation harnesses free market principles, such as supply
and demand equilibrium, promotion of self interest, and/or profit
maximization to justify contested wage disparities. Early on, employers
turned to market justifications to distance themselves from accusations that
their animus toward women (and other protected groups) motivated their
adverse decisions.20 Basically their defense culminated in asserting “it’s
not me, it’s the market, which forced me to treat women unfavorably.” In
effect, two market theory assumptions were brought together. First,
employers are usually not wage setters, but rather wage takers - following
the market rate, which is dictated by the supply and demand for employees
in the specific industry or profession. Second, efficient labor markets will
gradually eliminate any irrational or animus-based discrimination. The
concept that an employer can excuse sex-based decision-making with
rational and profit maximizing reasoning (as opposed to animus) was
quickly dismissed by the Supreme Court. In Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan,21 women inspectors working the day shift demanded pay equal to
19. The Supreme Court has declined to settle this question in Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist.
v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992).
20. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
21. Id.
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that of male inspectors working the night shift. For other jobs, there was
one wage rate applied both to day and night shifts. Corning argued that the
wage differential between day and night shift inspection jobs resulted from
the resistance of men to perform inspection work - work perceived by these
workers as demeaning feminine tasks.22 In order to fill the night shift,
Corning had to offer higher compensation than that offered to women
working the day shift. The Court determined that “the differential arose
simply because men would not work at the low rates paid to women
inspectors, and it reflected a job market in which Corning could pay
women less than men for the same work. That the company took
advantage of such a situation may be understandable as a matter of
economics, but its differential nevertheless became illegal once Congress
enacted into law the principle of equal pay for equal work.”23
After the Court held that the EPA prohibited compensation decisions
that consider sex, even if such pay disparities are supported by market
justification, a more subtle form of the market justification emerged. One
variation focuses on the legitimacy of the employer attempting to extract as
much of the contractual surplus as possible. In these cases, for example, an
employer argues that there is no legal obligation to offer individual workers
more than their initial pay demands, even if implementation of a wage
scheme based on employee wage demands ultimately disadvantages
women.24 Another strand emphasizes specific circumstances where
22. Id. at 205.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1980) (The plaintiff, a female
physical education teacher, accepted an initial job offer of $7,500. Subsequently, a male
teacher was hired, but did not accept the initial offer of $7,500 and demanded $9,000.
Special authorization by the school’s governing board was given to meet this compensation
demand. The court accepts this as a legitimate reason for the pay disparity, a reason other
than sex); see also Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309 (D.N.D. 1981) (Individual
negotiations for initial pay that resulted in higher pay for a male employee performing the
same job is not a violation of the EPA). Even the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, in its compliance manual for avoiding compensation discrimination, instructs
employers that as long as the employer treats women and men similarly when engaging in
compensation negotiations, any pay differentiation resulting from the negotiations is to be
attributed to a factor other than sex: “CP, a certified public accountant (CPA), claims that R
accounting firm violated the EPA by offering her a lower starting salary than it offered a
male CPA. R proves that it offered a higher salary to the male because he had very favorable
job references based on his productivity and successful track record in providing tax advice
to clients; he received other job offers at the higher salary; and he relied on those job offers
as a bargaining tool for negotiating the higher salary. R began salary discussions with CP
with the same opening offer as given to the male, and indicated it was ‘willing to go higher
if necessary.’ But CP did not bargain as assertively as the male CPA, and ended up with a
lower starting salary. There is no evidence that R treated CP any differently than the male
in salary negotiations. R has proved that the compensation disparity is based on a factor
other than sex, and therefore no EPA violation is found.” EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 10 ex. 42 (2000), available at
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employers are compelled by external market pressures to raise the
compensation of one employee but not another. For example, an employee
presents a counteroffer and threatens to quit if his current employer does
not match it.25 Similarly, temporal changes in the market wage in an
industry or profession can result in disparate compensation of two equally
productive employees, hired in separate time periods.26
The strength of these new versions of the market defense is that they
purport to sanction neutral criteria that regrettably resulted in an individual
female employee being paid less than a male co-worker,27 rather than being
offered as a justification for an intentionally sex-based compensation
decision. Employers have utilized these versions of the market justification
to overcome the causal link between sex and compensation level that a
plaintiff must prove under the traditional theory of discrimination. Courts
have accepted this line of reasoning in varying degrees.28
In the next subsections, this paper explores whether market
explanations do, in fact, undermine the causal link between wages and
gender. I set out to prove two assertions: First, despite being neutral on
their face, some market justifications adversely impact women as a group,
and therefore, the causal link between gender and pay is still present.

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/compensation.html.
25. See, e.g., Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003) (The employer asserted a
retention policy as a gender-neutral defense to the employee's unequal pay claim. The court
rejected the employee's argument that a salary retention policy could not serve as a factor
other than sex if it resulted in pay disparity between men and women); Winkes v. Brown
Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 792 (1st Cir. 1984) (An associate professor alleged that the raise given
to his female colleague was in violation of the EPA, after defendant matched the salary
offered to a female associate professor by another institution in order to dissuade her from
taking other employment. The court found that defendant sufficiently demonstrated that it
had a customary de facto policy of responding to outside offers from other universities when
it desired to keep a professor and his or her qualities merited such an action).
26. See, e.g., Ciardella v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 671 F. Supp. 699, 701 (D. Nev. 1987)
(Explaining that due to economic changes in the job market, the employer was required to
extend an offer of compensation of approximately $10,000 more per year than the plaintiff
was receiving while performing the same job).
27. Another commentator made a similar distinction dubbing the Corning Glass type of
market defense as the market conditions defense and the newer version as a market value
defense: “The market value defense differs from the market conditions defense in one
important aspect. Under the market value defense, the defendant attempts to prove an actual
difference in market demand for a particular employee. Under the market conditions
defense, the defendant makes broad assumptions about an entire class of employees based
on sex. The Court in Corning Glass clearly rejected a defense based on broad assumptions
about market conditions. Because the market value defense more strongly reflects a
defendant's prudent business judgment, however, the issue of whether courts should accept a
market value defense is a closer question.” Thomas H. McCarthy, Jr., Note, "Market Value"
as a Factor "Other Than Sex" in Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Claims, 1985 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1027, 1037 (1985).
28. See infra discussion of case law in section IV.C.
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Second, employers sometimes claim that their decisions are constrained by
external market pressures, when in fact their decisions are not subject to
such pressures. Rather their compensation schemes are a product of
internal institutional policies and politics that are sometimes entangled with
gender stereotypes and other sex-based considerations. If this is an
accurate description of labor market practices, market justifications as a
normative matter should not be accepted as a legitimate defense in pay
discrimination cases. Denying such defenses will also promote uniformity
and coherence in the treatment of market-based defenses that disadvantage
women.
B. Market Justifications Feed and Perpetuate the Gender Wage Gap
In their influential book, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the
Gender Gap, Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever present empirical
evidence on the difference between the manner in which women and men
engage in salary negotiations.29 The results of their research pose
disturbing implications for the impact of allowing market justifications
upon the gender wage gap. The essence of their findings is that women are
more hesitant than men to initiate and pursue negotiations over wages.30
Women are less likely than men to negotiate over initial wage offers when
accepting a new job.31 They are also less likely than men to demand a raise
or seek counteroffers to boost their current compensation.32 The different
negotiation skills that women and men bring to the bargaining table impact
the gender wage distribution in institutions that rely heavily on individual
bargaining to set wages.
The book first illustrates the disparity in starting salaries of graduates
with a master’s degree from Carnegie Melon University. Male graduates
received an initial average salary 7.6% higher than that of female
graduates.33 The cause of the gendered differential in the average wage
was that 57% of men negotiate over the initial offer they received, while
only 7% of the female graduates did so.34 This data shows that a majority
of men used an initial salary offer as a starting point for negotiations, while
most women simply accepted the initial offer.
The researchers point to the attainment of early childhood social skills
as the explanation for the difference in negotiation skills. Boys are

29. LINDA BABCOCK & SARAH LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE (2002).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1-2.
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encouraged to ask for things they want and tend to believe that they have
control over the circumstances that shape their lives. Young girls are
taught to focus on the needs of others and to apply less control in altering
their own situation. Therefore, women are less inclined than men to come
forward and demand raises, bargain over initial wages, or approach other
employers to solicit competing job offers.35
Another line of research complementing the gender negotiation
literature investigates the correlation between competitive behavior and
gender. Muriel Niedele has been conducting experiments demonstrating
that women shy away from competitive environments, while men not only
welcome them, but perform better when competing.36 Wage negotiations
are commonly seen as a competition, and women tend to avoid it. Again,
the variance in attitudes and performance in a competitive setting is linked
to the development of early social skills and a disparity in the selfconfidence women and men exhibit in their belief in the chances of
winning the competition.37 These beliefs affect both one’s willingness to
compete and performance in competition. The negotiation literature also
emphasizes the importance of the negotiator’s self-confidence and
optimism. There is correlation between self–confidence, optimism, and the
final outcome of the negotiation: If you expect more, you will get more.38
Tied to these findings are experimental studies, revealing that women,
absent external information, value the economic worth of their work less
than do men.39 In one of the first studies on self-perception of entitlement,
participants were requested to perform a task.40 After completion of the
task, participants were divided into two groups.41 The first group was
35. See id. at 62-84.
36. See generally Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle & Aldo Rustichini, Performance in
Competitive Environments: Gender Differences, 118 Q. J. OF ECON. 1049 (2003) (stating
that when women and men compete against one another, women may perform less well than
men, even if they perform similarly in non-competitive environments); Muriel Niederle &
Lisa Vesterlund, Gender Differences in Competition, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 447 (2008)
[hereinafter Gender Differences]; Muriel Niederle & Lisa Vesterlund, Do Women Shy Away
from Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?, 122 Q. J. OF ECON. 1067 (2007)
[hereinafter Women Shy Away].
37. See Gender Differences in Competition, supra note 36, at 456-57.
38. See Babcock & Laschever, supra note 29, at 130-42.
39. See Hart Blanton et al., Contexts of System Justification and System Evaluation:
Exploring the Social Comparison Strategies of the (Not Yet) Contented Female Worker, 4
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 126 (2001) (comparing women’s satisfaction with
pay rate with men’s); Brett W. Pelham & John J. Hetts, Underworked and Overpaid:
Elevated Entitlement in Men's Self-Pay, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93 (2001)
(discussing University of California study on depressed entitlement).
40. See Charlene M. Callahan-Levy & Lawrence A. Messe, Sex Differences in the
Allocation of Pay, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 433 (1979) (interpreting results of a
study at Michigan State University).
41. Id.

RABINFINAL[1]

816

6/1/2010 10:44:58 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:3

asked to assign compensation to themselves for performing the task.42 The
second group was asked to decide the compensation other participants
received for the task.43 On average, women in the first group assigned 19%
lower compensation for themselves than men did, but when compensating
other participants, women were slightly more generous than men regardless
of the sex of the participant they were compensating.44 However, there was
no difference in the participants’ evaluation of the quality of their work.45
These results show that women undervalue their work but are able to more
objectively assess the value of others’ work. Men, on the other hand, did
not exhibit such a discrepancy. A follow up study included a third group,
which was required to assign compensation to themselves, like the first
group, but were provided with a bogus list containing information on how
much other participants paid themselves. Under these conditions, women
adjusted their compensation upward to meet the rates included in the list.46
The results of this study suggest that a lack of information about the going
rate of compensation tends to depress women’s wages and contributes to
the gender wage gap47.
These empirical findings can also shed light on why women’s
reservation wage is often lower than men’s. The conventional explanation
emphasizes market discrimination48 and the greater variance in women’s
attachment to the paid labor market than men’s.49 But a low self-valuation
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Two decades later, at Yale College, female students still paid themselves 18%
less than male students did, for work that was indistinguishable in quality or content. John
T. Jost, An Experimental Replication of the Depressed-Entitlement Effect Among Women, 21
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 387 (1997). In another experiment, participants were instructed to
perform a task until they thought they earned four dollars. Women worked on average 22%
longer than men and were 32% more productive than men. Brenda Major et al.,
Overworked and Underpaid: On the Nature of Gender Differences in Personal Entitlement,
47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1399 (1984).
46. Major, supra note 45.
47. See also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 550 U.S. 618, 650 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority opinion, which denies an Equal Pay Act
claim). Justice Ginsburg references the importance of allowing women to access reliable
information on compensation when combating compensation discrimination in the
workplace. The Paycheck Fairness Act similarly addresses the issue of the lack of vital
wage information. The bill institutes a retaliatory cause of action against employers who
retaliate against employees that engage in information sharing and inquire about wages. It
also requires the EEOC to survey pay data and obligates employers to submit any needed
pay data identified by the race, sex and national origin of employees. The Paycheck
Fairness Act §§ 3, 8, supra note 188.
48. See Heather Antecol & Peter Kuhn, Gender as an Impediment to Labor Market
Success: Why Do Young Women Report Greater Harm?, 18 J. LAB. ECON. 702 (2000)
(analyzing effects of age and gender on employment).
49. See Audra Bowlus, A Search Interpretation of Male-Female Wage Differentials, 15
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of one’s work, whether intrinsic or caused by a lack of relevant and
accurate information, depresses women’s reservation wage. There is a
correlation between a high estimation of the market value of the job
performed and a high reservation wage.50 Holding productivity constant, a
lower reservation wage translates into a larger contractual surplus to be
divided between the employer and employees. Even if the employer
extracts an identical share of the surplus through bargaining, the employee
will end up with lower wages than a co-worker whose reservation wage
was initially set higher.
To illustrate the insights discussed so far, take for example two
employees, Emma and Ben, with equivalent productivity of $100 per day.
This sets the upper limit to their compensation at a rate of $100 per day.
Due to the constraints described above, Emma values her productivity at
$80, while Ben estimates his productivity at $95. Emma sets her
reservation wage, which is the minimum wage she is willing to work for, at
$50 and Ben sets it at $60. The fact that Emma estimates her productivity
will be lower than Ben does not necessitate that her reservation wage must
also be lower; she could be unwilling to work for less than $75 a day, even
if she estimates her productivity only at $85.51 The contractual surplus in
Emma’s case is $50 and in Ben’s case it is only $40. This puts Ben at an
advantage, because even if in both cases bargaining will result in splitting
the surplus evenly, Emma will end up with a wage rate of $75 per day and
Ben with $80. Taking into account their subjective evaluations of their
productivities, Emma estimates the contractual surplus at $30 compared to
Ben’s estimate of $35. Splitting the employee-perceived surplus evenly in
both cases will result in $65 for Emma and $77.50 for Ben.
When incorporating the information about the systemic differences in
the way women and men approach and handle wage negotiation, it is fair to
assume that Ben will be able to extract a higher share of the actual
employment contractual surplus. Emma may not engage in bargaining at
all, and if she does, she will be less effective. Emma will set her
bargaining goals lower, partly because both her reservation wage and
subjective estimation of her productivity is lower than Ben’s, and partly
J. LAB. ECON. 625 (1997) (showing that differences in anticipated labor force attachment led
to lower reservation wages for women).
50. See Peter Orazem, James Werbel & James McElroy, Market Expectations, Job
Search, and Gender Differences in Starting Pay, 24 J. LAB. RESEARCH 307 (2003)
(demonstrating that women had lower starting salary expectations, even with the same
major, labor market information and job search strategies; lower pay expectations led to
lower pay outcome for women).
51. I structured the dollar amounts in the example to mirror the findings that women on
average estimate their productivity lower than men and also have a lower reservation wage.
It is also a plausible assumption that when you estimate your productivity at a lower rate
there is a depressing effect on your reservation wage.
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because she is not socialized to bargain for her own benefit and is averse to
the competitive environment of wage negotiations. If this results in Emma
extracting 10% of the surplus while Ben succeeds in extracting 20%,
Emma will be compensated at a rate of $55 compared to Ben’s
compensation of $72.
This hypothetical example illustrates that various factors pertaining to
individual salary negotiation may contribute to gender wage disparity.
None of these factors is connected to any objective measure of
productivity, but some are linked to gender, and adversely impacting
women, thus meeting the causation requirement underlying traditional
discrimination law, under disparate impact law.
C. Market Justifications May Serve as a Pretext for Discriminatory
Behavior
The strand of the market justification, emphasizing external market
pressures, assumes that both employers and employees are “price takers” in
the sense that the external market determines the wage rate for industries
and occupation. Under this theory, the only discretion an employer
exercises is determining how many employees they are willing to hire at
the going wage. It is thus argued that when the employer is not the one
who is actively setting wages, but simply following the market rate, he
should not be held liable for the external valuation of worth.52
This intuition is probably one of the main causes for the failure of the
comparable worth movement. In the late seventies to mid eighties,
comparable worth proponents advanced, unsuccessfully, the argument that
when job segregation results in the depression of wages of female
occupations compared to comparably worth male occupation, this should
be perceived as sex discrimination.53 But courts resisted expansion of
discrimination law based on this theory, explaining that when an employer
pays his workers according to the market’s going wage, wages are not
actively set in a discriminatory manner. The employer is simply following
the rules of supply and demand for the various jobs, even if the outcome is
that female-dominated occupations attain lower compensation levels than
comparably worth male-dominated occupations.54
The rejection of
52. An exception to the underlying assumption that employers should not be held liable
for following the market wage rate are cases in which the employer intentionally classifies
employees by sex to take advantage of women’s lower reservation, as was the situation in
the Corning Glass plant. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 215 (1974).
53. See generally Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728 (1986) (arguing that there is real value in comparable worth).
54. The final blow to the endeavor to incorporate comparable worth into Title VII was
in American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 722 (7th Cir. 1986) (allowing a
suit by nurses on separate discrimination grounds, but denying the applicability of
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comparable worth rested partially on the strong belief that employers are
wage takers for the various occupations for which they hire workers.55
In the past decade, new sociological research challenged the
assumption that employers are mere wage takers when determining
compensation. In some cases, internal institutional constraints and politics
play a greater role than we (and the courts) are willing to acknowledge.
Although employers are taking into account prevailing market wage rates
for the relevant positions at issue,56 they are also influenced by internal
power dynamics and patterns of conflict vis-à-vis different groups of
employees. This may result in managerial decisions to compensate some
groups or occupations beyond the rate warranted by external market
constraints.
Although this research targets gender-based occupational segregation,
it is also relevant to the general discussion about the validity of the market
defense. The market defense draws its strength from the assertion that
wages are determined by external forces. If this premise questioned by
empirical analysis, employers can no longer claim that they are not actively
participating in setting wages. If they have some input in determining
wages, and consciously decide to adhere to demands of specific groups of
employees by compensating them above the market rate and this decision
results in pay disparity between men and women, then this could be
conceptualized as sex discrimination. At this point, pay disparity would
not be the product of adhering to the external market valuation, but rather
following some internal process of institutional decision-making. If this is
the case, the market cannot be blamed for the wage disparity across
individuals or groups of employees.
In Legalizing Gender Inequality: Courts, Markets and Unequal Pay
for Women in America,57 sociologists Robert Nelson and William Bridges
conduct a thorough qualitative investigation, which they term “critical

comparable worth).
55. See AFSCME v. State of Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1408 (1985) (“The State of
Washington's initial reliance on a free market system in which employees in maledominated jobs are compensated at a higher rate than employees in dissimilar femaledominated jobs is not in and of itself a violation of Title VII, notwithstanding that the Willis
study deemed the positions of comparable worth. Absent a showing of discriminatory
motive, which has not been made here, the law does not permit the federal courts to interfere
in the market-based system for the compensation of Washington's employees.”); Briggs v.
Madison, 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982) (granting dismissal of a sex discrimination
claim where the defendant argued that higher market wages for sanitarians than for nurses
were responsible for pay disparities between female and male employees).
56. Usually pay does not fall under the prevailing market rate.
57. ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (Cambridge University
Press 1999).
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empiricism,” into four high profile comparable worth cases.58 They
examine whether market forces, as argued by the defendants and accepted
by the courts, were the cause of the pay disparity across gendered
occupations. As students of organizational behavior, they are interested in
understanding how organizations unconsciously effectuate gender
inequality.
In one of the cases, Christensen v. Iowa,59 female clerical workers
filed a pay discrimination lawsuit against the University of Northern
Iowa.60 They claimed that they were underpaid in comparison to male
physical plant workers, even though both occupations were assigned
identical pay grades in an internal job evaluation report.61 Specifically, the
report stated that physical plant workers were overpaid relative to clerical
workers and that the physical plant workers’ pay was inflated compared to
external market pay rates for similar jobs.62 The University chose not to
implement the recommendations; it sincerely feared that it would not be
able to attract physical plant workers at the wage rate that it was paying the
predominantly female clerical workers.63 The market justification was not
presented as an excuse for conscious sex discrimination and a deliberate
decision to pay male occupations more, but rather as an unconscious
process in which internal power structures affected how management
perceived market rates for the gendered jobs.64
The University’s perception that it could not lower the current wages
of physical plant workers was based on the organizational strength of that
group of workers. “The Physical plant workers, informally known as the
‘meatpackers’, because of their identification with unionized workers
engaged in self-conscious collective bargaining. The clerical workers, in
contrast, were content to participate in amicable ‘committee’ meetings with
university officials.”65 This led the University to “worry about the union
guys but not the women”.66 The authors argue that while the employer was
speaking in terms of the market to justify its pay scheme “the market did
not compel the University’s decision. Organizational politics compelled
the University to give selective attention to the demands of workers in
predominantly male jobs.”67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 101-05.
Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
Id. at 354
Id.
Id.
Nelson & Bridges, supra note 57, at 156-58.
Id. at 160-66.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 166.
Id.
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This study, as well as others,68 demonstrate that even if we generally
embrace the market defense, i.e. accept wage disparities resulting from
external market forces, we may encounter circumstances where what
initially is deemed an external factor turns out to be an internal institutional
decision unrelated to external market wage rates. Since discerning which
cases carry a true market component and which reflect institutional politics
and structures is a tricky matter, we should be extremely suspicious of any
market claim presented.
D. Current Treatment of Market Justifications is Inconsistent
Paying women less than men just because the employer realizes he
can hire women for less pay than men is discriminatory.69 This type of
behavior falls neatly within the traditional framework of antidiscrimination
theory. The employer is basing employment decisions, compensation, on
the applicant’s or employee’s gender and is offering less pay, because an
applicant or employee is a woman. The causation requirement is clearly
met, despite the employer’s ability to differentiate compensation based on
factors external to his operation. On the other hand, when an employer
bases compensation decisions on factors other than sex, and these other
factors are not related to ability or productivity, the law is ambiguous. In
that situation, courts implicitly instruct that as long as the employer did not
resort to sex-based classifications, he is on safe grounds. The employer is
free to construct whatever wage structure he desires, extracting profit from
the fact that reservation wages, compensation expectations, and negotiation
skills vary among the pool of similar job applicants.
However, relying on a market justification can result, in both
scenarios, in gender wage disparities.
In Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan70 and Christensen v. Iowa,71 the employer explained his wage
structure in terms of external market constraints or opportunities (to pay
women less than men). In both cases, external market valuations were
blamed for generating the internal gender wage disparity. The reason the
University of Iowa prevailed, while Corning failed, relates to the source of
the employer’s own classification. Corning confessed it classified
employees based on sex, while the University of Iowa admitted only to
68. See Robert L. Nelson, Ellen C. Berrey & Laura Beth Nielsen, Divergent Paths:
Conflicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4
ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 103 (2008) (surveying social scientific research which documents
the pervasiveness of unintentional bias and the persistence of organizational processes that
generate workplace discrimination).
69. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 215 (1974) (espousing this
rationale).
70. Id.
71. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
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classification based on occupation. Usually, employers arguing that the
sources of the pay disparity are classifications or factors other than sex can
successfully defend their market explanation.
This doctrinal inconsistency in addressing market arguments is driven
by the centrality of the causation model. Only in cases such as Corning
Glass, where evidence that a causal link between the sex of the plaintiffs
and the compensation decision exists, are the courts willing to dismiss the
market defense.72 In other cases resulting in similar pay discrepancies
between men and women, the market justification is given credence.73
After all, no causal link between the compensation practice and the sex of
the plaintiffs was articulated, and the courts respect the employer’s
apparently nondiscriminatory business judgment.74
The similarity between these two scenarios warrants parallel treatment
of the market defense. In both cases, the employer is not driven by animus
toward women, but rather by profit maximization considerations. In both
cases, women’s wages are adversely affected by a compensation policy,
contributing to the gender wage disparity. The fact that in the latter case
one cannot pinpoint the causal process that connects the decision to gender
should not serve as a strong basis for sanctioning market arguments. The
rationale of Corning Glass Works—that an employer cannot pay women
less than men for performing the same work—should govern all
circumstances of market driven wage disparities.

72. Other cases clarifying this point are Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 241
n.12 (5th Cir. 1973) (stating that:
“Loveman's contends that the tighter market for salesmen and male tailors
justifies its hiring of men with such skills at a rate higher than that paid to obtain
women of similar skills. While factors other than sex (customer embarrassment
primarily) justify the employer in seeking male personnel to work in
conjunction with selling and fitting male clothing, this is no excuse for hiring
saleswomen and seamstresses at lesser rates simply because the market will
bear it. Just such disparities were what Congress intended to correct by this
legislation.”).
See also Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970)
("Clearly the fact that the employer's bargaining power is greater with respect to women
than with respect to men is not the kind of factor [other than sex] Congress had in mind.
Thus it will not do for the hospital to press the point that it paid orderlies more because it
could not get them for less.”).
73. See supra notes 24-26 and infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
74. See McCarthy, supra note 27, at 1042 (“If the defendant must pay certain
employees more either to attract or to keep those employees, then prudent business
judgment would require that the defendant pay those employees more. The defendant’s
business judgment is facially nondiscriminatory.”).
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III. THE DIFFICULTY OF USING TRADITIONAL DISCRIMINATION MODELS
TO CONFRONT MARKET JUSTIFICATIONS

A. The Traditional Discrimination Framework: Emphasizing Causation
The market-defense controversy presents a challenge to employment
discrimination theory due to the centrality of causation in conceptualizing
discrimination in American law.
Fundamentally, discrimination is
understood to be the action of treating people differently on the basis of
some prohibited group classification.75 In the case of sex discrimination, it
is taking action based on gender. The causal link between the scrutinized
action and group membership must be articulated.
Title VII embraces the causation requirement both in its disparate
treatment model and disparate impact model. The causation requirement is
salient in disparate treatment theory. The ultimate question in any
disparate treatment litigation is whether a plaintiff was able to meet her
burden of persuasion and demonstrate that sex (or any other regulated
group membership category) was a motivating factor in the employment
decision.76 There are a couple of ways to meet this burden. A plaintiff
could resort to direct evidence or circumstantial evidence (including
statistical evidence).77 Nevertheless, at the end of the day, she must
convince the fact finder that her gender was a motivating factor in the final
decision regarding compensation, denial of promotion, termination, or
sexual harassment.
In disparate impact theory, the centrality of the causation requirement
is covert, but nonetheless present. Under disparate impact theory,78 a
plaintiff argues that an employment practice adversely impacts members of
a protected group. This is a statistical claim. The claim is that there is a
strong statistical correlation between group membership and the
employment practice. If no data on statistical correlation are offered, the

75. See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L. REV. 834, 859867 (2000) (surveying the justifications for the group-based theory of discrimination).
76. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (stating that
acceptable evidence of discrimination for an ADEA claim was present); St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993) (rejecting idea that nondiscriminatory interest
completely destroys a discrimination claim).
77. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (stating
that a legitimate reason eliminates the need to prove nondiscriminatory intent);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that a race and age discrimination
complaint does not require a pleading to be more detailed than normal).
78. See Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (initially articulating disparate
impact). The disparate impact framework was later codified in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k).
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employer is not required to defend his decision making process.79 Since
disparate impact is based on providing statistical data on the correlation
between employment practices and group membership, it also entails a
causation requirement. Although the plaintiff is relieved of the requirement
to demonstrate that employment actions were based on group membership,
she is still obliged to demonstrate the statistical correlation (i.e. impact)
between employment practices and group membership.
B. Limitation of the Causation Model in Addressing Gender Wage
Disparities

i. Disparate Treatment Law
Disparate treatment law is ill-suited to deal with gender pay disparity
resulting from market considerations. An employer can avoid liability if
they can persuade the fact finder that pay decisions were solely based on
other factors than the employee’s gender. Offering market justifications for
the decision severs the causal link between the sex of the plaintiff and the
lower compensation level. A genuine external market justification does not
fit within the causation model described. It is not because of the plaintiff’s
sex that she was paid less than another co-worker performing the same
work, but because of a factor unrelated to sex - such as the fact she did not
demand annual raises, did not negotiate her initial salary, or another factor
which is not regulated by law.
As discussed above, in disparate treatment litigation, plaintiffs will
only prevail in the limited cases in which they can establish causation
between their sex and wage determination. Corning Glass is of limited
application. Presently, most employers do not intentionally pay women
less than men. Arguments that employers basing compensation decisions
on factors such as prior salaries are engaging in intentional sex
discrimination because those prior salaries reflect sex discrimination in the
labor market have also failed under disparate treatment law, unless a
plaintiff can offer specific evidence that the previous employer engaged in
discriminatory practices when setting wages.80
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (“If the respondent demonstrates that a
specific employment practice does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not
be required to demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.”).
80. See Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 470 (7th Cir. 2005)
(“Wage patterns in some lines of work could be discriminatory, but this is something to be
proved rather than assumed. Wernsing has not offered expert evidence (or even a citation to
the literature of labor economics) to support a contention that the establishments from which
the Department recruits its employees use wage scales that violate the Equal Pay Act and
thus discriminate against women. If sex discrimination led to lower wages in the ‘feeder’
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Ambiguity of the market justification and obstacles in verifying its
existence hinder the success of sex discrimination claims based on
disparate treatment. The sociological studies revealing salience of intrainstitutional structures and internal firm politics to wage determination
could possibly aid prospective plaintiffs. If the claim is that the employer
is responsible for setting lower pay for women performing equal work as
male co-workers and that this process is independent, or loosely dependent,
on external market constraints, one can possibly meet the causation
requirement that the employer is basing his decision on sex (and not the
market). But as empirical studies illustrate, providing the background
information for such a factual claim is an onerous, time-consuming and
expensive task. In individual claims this may not be worth the cost. In
group-based claims, such as a class action, the investment in collecting
information, hiring expert witnesses, and laying out the argument of
intentional internal practices rather than market driven disparities may be
an economically sensible decision.
Plaintiffs could present social framework evidence81 to support their
claim that underlying sex discrimination was a motivating factor in
compensation decisions. Such evidence was successfully utilized in high
profile discrimination cases such as Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins82 and
Dukes v. Walmart Inc.83 In social framework testimony an expert witness
can explain how “general research results are used to construct a frame of
reference or background context for deciding factual issues crucial to the
resolution of a specific case.”84
In the context of employment
discrimination litigation it usually is offered to “educate fact-finders about
the conditions under which gender stereotypes and prejudices are likely to
influence impressions, evaluations and behavior in social and organization
settings.”85

jobs, then using those wages as the base for pay at the Department would indeed perpetuate
discrimination and violate the Equal Pay Act.”); Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., 692 F.2d
873, 876 (9th Cir. 1982) (presenting the same contention as Wernsing).
81. The use of social framework evidence in employment discrimination litigation has
recently come under attack from the same scholars who introduced the term. See John
Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715 (2008); but
see Melissa Hart and Paul Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (2009) (presenting a
warm endorsement of the practice).
82. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
83. Dukes v. Walmart Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d 509 F. 3d 1168 (9th
Cir. 2007), review en banc granted, 2009 WL 365818 (9th Cir. Feb. 13, 2009).
84. Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987).
85. Susan T. Fiske & Eugene Borgida, Providing Expert Knowledge in an Adversarial
Context: Social Cognitive Science in Employment Discrimination Cases, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
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When using social framework testimony to explain how employers
stereotype women according to gender roles, the argument is clear: women
are not expected to behave like men, and those that do are punished for this
cross-gender behavior.86 This satisfies the causation requirement that the
disparity in treatment was “because of sex.” When we enter the domain of
internal firm processes affecting terms and conditions of employment we
are on less stable grounds.87 While the theory that the employer is partially
insulated from external market forces is easy to articulate, providing
evidence in specific cases that this amounts to sex based discrimination is
more difficult.
Take for example, Christensen v. Iowa,88 where an expert witness
explained that the university was basing its compensation scheme on an
unfounded perception that it could not hire physical plant workers at lower
rates than it was currently paying. Although this perception was based on
the internal pressure this group of employees was exerting on management,
this still does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it was paying them
more because of their sex. Perhaps it was just their organizational power,
and the fact that they were men was incidental. The expert testimony could
only refute the employer’s offered explanation that external market forces
warranted the higher wages for the male dominated occupation. This does
not amount to proving a causal link between sex and lower wages for
women.89 Disparate treatment theory places the ultimate burden of
SOC. SCI. 123, 128 (2008).
86. This notion was the crux of the expert testimony in the Price Waterhouse litigation.
Susan Fiske, a renowned social psychologist, testified about how the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins,
was denied partnership at an accounting firm due to gender stereotyping and the discomfort
of her colleagues caused by her seemingly masculine behavior. The court dismissed the
employer’s objection to relying on testimony which applies general psychological research
to the facts of the case: “Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske's expert testimony
was merely icing on Hopkins' cake. It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping
in a description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school.’
Nor, turning to Thomas Beyer's memorable advice to Hopkins, does it require expertise in
psychology to know that, if an employee's flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a
soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee's sex and not her
interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228, 256 (1989).
87. There is no exclusion of sociologists giving expert testimony, although the common
practice is to hire cognitive and social psychologists. Matthew Wise, From Price
Waterhouse to Dukes and Beyond: Bridging the Gap Between Law and Social Science By
Improving the Admissibility Standard for Expert Testimony, 26 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 545,
561 (2005).
88. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
89. Nelson and Bridges are aware of the caveat: “if the trial court had come to the same
interpretation of the events as we offer, it does not necessarily follow that the plaintiffs
would have prevailed. The option of the court of appeals contains language that might treat
the political effectiveness of various groups of workers as a valid basis for paying them
different wages.” Nelson & Bridges, supra note 57 at 167.
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persuasion on the plaintiff.90 The fact that the plaintiff was able to discredit
the external market defense with expert testimony does not mandate
liability.91 The fact finder must also be convinced that sex was a
motivating factor in the compensation decision.92 Not all internally-driven
compensation schemes that result in lower wages for women performing
the same work as men satisfy this condition.
ii. Disparate Impact Law
At first blush, disparate impact law seems an adequate means of
handling the market defense. Disparate impact law is all about identifying
and then scrutinizing the business-relevancy of neutral employment
practices that adversely impact a protected class.93 In theory, this is the
vehicle to examine whether market-based practices are harming women,
and if there is an adverse impact, to assess whether there is a legitimate
management interest in continuing such a market-based practice. However,
disparate impact proves to be an unfaithful servant to wage equality
because of doctrinal and practical issues.
The first problem is that it is unclear whether disparate impact theory
is available for plaintiffs claiming gender based pay discrimination. The
Bennett Amendment, a coordination clause between the EPA and Title VII,
states that there will be no Title VII violation if the compensation
differentiation is “authorized by the provision of section 206 (d) of title
29”94 of the EPA. There are two possible interpretations of the Bennett
Amendment. A broad interpretation would preclude a finding of violation
in a case of gender based pay discrimination, unless the practice would
have violated the Equal Pay Act as well, including the restrictive condition
of “equal work.” A narrower reading of the amendment would incorporate
only the four affirmative defenses of the EPA95
In Washington v. Gunther the Supreme Court opted for the narrow
interpretation, enabling plaintiffs basing their wage discrimination claims

90. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (holding
that employer bore no burden of persuasion that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for
the challenged employment action existed).
91. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (holding that the trier of
fact’s rejection of employer’s asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
challenged actions does not entitle employee to judgment as a matter of law under the
McDonnell Douglas scheme applicable to discriminatory treatment cases).
92. Id.
93. Andrew Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate
Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
95. See Weiler, supra note 53, at 1734-35.

RABINFINAL[1]

828

6/1/2010 10:44:58 AM

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 12:3

on Title VII to avoid proving the jobs compared involved “equal work.” 96
But the Court did explain the amendment could have significant
consequences for Title VII litigation, on account of the fourth affirmative
defense to an EPA claim. This defense states the employer can justify pay
disparity resulting from “any other factor other than sex” (Hereinafter:
“AFOTS defense”). The court intimated but did not decide whether the
AFOTS defense undermines Griggs-type disparate impact analysis under
the EPA, and by the Bennett Amendment, under Title VII as well.97 The
Court did not conclusively decide this issue in Gunther.98 On this judicial
intimation several jurisdictions have interpreted the EPA and Title VII as
restricting sex based compensation discrimination claims to disparate
treatment type analysis.99 Other courts resisted, continuing to apply
disparate impact analysis to both EPA and Title VII claims.100
In Smith v. City of Jackson, an age discrimination case that looked into
the applicability of disparate impact to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (1967),101 the Supreme Court noted in a footnote: “if
Congress intended to prohibit all disparate impact claims, it could have
certainly done so.102 For instance, in the Equal Pay Act, Congress barred
recovery if pay differential was based “on any other factor”—reasonable or
unreasonable—“other than sex.”103 Again, there is a strong suggestion,
albeit in dictum, that the EPA’s fourth affirmative defense effectively rules
out disparate impact.104
96. Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
97. Id. at 170-71.
98. The court addressed this issue in Gunther only to explain why a narrow reading of
the Bennett Amendment would not necessarily render it superfluous. Id. at 171 (“Although
we do not decide in this case how sex-based wage discrimination litigation under Title VII
should be structured to accommodate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act . .
. we consider it clear that the Bennett Amendment, under this interpretation, is not rendered
superfluous.”).
99. See generally cases discussed infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1988) (“In our
circuit, however, the Bennett Amendment cannot constitute a blanket bar to all claims of
wage discrimination based on disparate impact because the ‘factor other than sex’ defense
does not include literally any other factor, but a factor that, at a minimum, was adopted for a
legitimate business reason.”). For a full discussion of the split among this circuits pertaining
to the interpretation of the AFOTS defense, see Ruben Bolivar Pagan, Defending the
"Acceptable Business Reason" Requirement of the Equal Pay Act: A Response to the
Challenges of Wernsing v. Department of Human Services, 33 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1007
(2008).
101. 29 U.S.C. § §621-633a (2000).
102. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
103. Id. at 239.
104. The suggestion in Gunther that disparate impact is not available under Title VII is
misguided. This suggestion would lead to an implausible situation where two similar claims
of Title VII compensation discrimination, one claiming race or national origin base
discrimination and the other claiming sex based discrimination, would not be offered the
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For individual claimants, the disparate impact course of action may
prove too expensive. It is not sufficient to argue that to prove specific
practices disparately impact women compared to men, the plaintiff has to
offer statistical data supporting the claim which requires collecting data and
hiring experts to conduct regression analysis. Take, for example, the
argument presented in section II.B that variance between the sexes in
negotiation skills and styles can adversely impact the compensation of
women. General reference to the negotiation literature on this topic will
not satisfy the requirement of statistical proof of disparate impact.105 Thus,
a successful plaintiff will have to engage in at least a three step process to
establish his prima facie case of disparate impact: (1) identify the
particular “market” practice they deemed discriminatory,106 (2) collect data
from within the organization on how this practice affected the wages of
individual employees, and (3) run the statistical regression analysis to show
the required disparity between men and women. It is highly unlikely that
individuals will find it worthwhile to invest the resources to pursue such
analysis.
But even if we focus on class action cases, where investment in
preparing a disparate impact claim may prove economically worthwhile,
the theory will encounter doctrinal hurdles. Statistical disparity resulting
from application of a neutral employment practice establishes only a prima
facie case of discrimination. At this point the employer has the opportunity
same scope of protection. The sex based claim would be restricted to disparate treatment,
while the race claim would resort to the disparate impact model as an alternative.
105. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (showing that
general population comparisons discounted by the Court). But see Dothard v. Rawlinson
433 U.S. 321 (1977) (finding that disparate impact was proven by using general population
data on how height and wage requirements disparately impact women in comparison to
men). The argument that negotiation practices adversely impact women more resembles the
Beazer decision, which dealt with the adverse impact of denying employment to individuals
who participated in methadone maintenance program on racial minorities. In both cases
there could be some variance between the impact of the practice on the defendant’s work
force and the impact on the general population. When dealing with height and weight
requirements, using general population data may be appropriate because there is no reason
to suspect that a specific workplace will display different patterns from the general
population. Many nuanced considerations are usually present when dealing with
compensation determination. The employer can rightly demand that the statistical
regression analysis will be conducted on his actual workforce.
106. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which codified disparate impact law, relieves the
plaintiff of the requirement to isolate specific employment practices for the statistical
analysis in cases where “the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent’s decision making process are not capable of separation for
analysis” in which case “the decision making process may be analyzed as one employment
practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). But this exemption is usually irrelevant
to the situation discussed in this Article, where the plaintiff targets a specific employment
practice, such as reliance on prior salaries, matching counter offers, or individual
negotiations, which can be separated from the bottom-line compensation decision.
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to demonstrate that the challenged practice is “job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.”107 This is a relevancy
test. In other contexts of disparate impact law the business necessity
defense has been interpreted quite broadly.108 Although cost-saving
justifications have been rejected in the context of disparate treatment,109
usually when an employer raises a cost-saving or profit-enhancing
argument for his disparate impact practice, it will qualify as a “business
necessity.”110 Structuring pay levels in a manner that takes into account
employee individual wage expectations or demands may meet the applied
standard of Title VII business necessity. The business necessity defense is
not restricted to productivity or ability arguments. It is rather a loosereviewing mechanism, which engages in a balancing act between the
interest of protected group members and the interest of the employer.111
When it comes to profitability or labor cost saving claims, the scale is
skewed toward the employer’s interest.112 Under this standard of review,
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)(2000).
108. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 705-706 (2006) (concluding that “while it is true that the disparate impact theory
allows proof of discrimination without the need to prove intent, employers are allowed to
justify their practices under a business necessity test. Because that test allows for normative
judgments regarding what practices are properly defined as discriminatory, courts readily
accept most proffered justifications.”); Spiropoulos, supra note 93 (The Supreme Court has
implemented two standards of review for the business necessity defense. When skill and
jobs can be measured by scientific validation techniques the court is more willing to
scrutinize the business justification of the employer. But for jobs requiring special skills
and other qualities that cannot be measures empirically the courts give more latitude to the
employer’s discretion.).
109. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 717 (1978)
(holding that challenged differential violated Title VII); see also Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (presenting a similar rejection of a profit
argument under the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense in a disparate
treatment case).
110. Mark S. Brodin, Costs, Profits, And Equal Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
318 (1987).
111. After the employer establishes a business necessity defense, the plaintiff can still
resort to offering an alternative employment practice which achieves the same goal as the
disparately impacting practice. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)(2000). Yet plaintiffs
will find it hard to come up with alternative practices which are as cost effective.
112. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988) (detailing
how an employer “head of household” benefit scheme was challenged under disparate
impact law. The employer covered only spouses of employees that earned more than half of
the couple’s total income. This program disparately impacted the coverage of women as
compared to men. Business necessity was established since the objective was to cover the
neediest employees, at the lowest cost. Taking cost into account was not governed by the
Manhart decision since it did not intend to discriminate between the sexes.); Wambheim v.
J.C. Penny Co. 705 F.2d 1492 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating the same contention); Christensen v.
Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977) (willing to accept, under Title VII jurisprudence, an
employer’s adherence to market pressure in setting wages: “We find nothing in the text and
history of Title VII suggesting that Congress intended to abrogate the laws of supply and
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proponents of the market justifications can argue that negotiation
techniques which may disparately impact women are lawful.113 If the
techniques are aimed at promoting profitability by extracting more of the
contractual surplus, they may meet the threshold of the business necessity
standard.
Ian Ayres offers the following guidelines for crafting the contours of
“business necessity” with relation to the increasing profitability
argument114:
Policies that exploit a firm's market power to extract supracompetitive profits from employees or consumers should not fall
within the limits of the business necessity defense in disparate
impact litigation. Even though such policies can substantially
enhance a firm's profitability, profits that are the byproduct of
market failure are less justified than those that are a byproduct of
competition. By enjoining employment and consumer policies
that extract supra-competitive profits disproportionately from
racial minorities and other protected classes, disparate impact law
can help make markets both more competitive and less racially
discriminatory.115
Ayres’s contribution is in noticing “not all increments to profitability
deserve equal judicial respect.”116 He sketches this vignette:
An employer pays high-school graduates an amount equal to their
marginal productivity but institutes a new policy of paying nonhigh school graduates less. Imagine that the policy has a
disparate impact against African Americans, who, in this
hypothetical, are less likely to have a high school diploma. The
employer might justify the pay difference by arguing that nongraduates tend to be less productive than high-school graduates.
I will call this the productivity defense. In the alternative, the
employer might try to justify paying non-graduates less, not

demand or other economic principles that determine wage rates for various kinds of work.
We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the market in setting wage
rates for genuinely different work classifications.”).
113. The Supreme Court has stated that an employer’s decision to grant a larger raise to
lower echelon employees for the purpose of bringing salaries in line with that of
surrounding police forces was a decision based on a "reasonable factor other than age" in
relation to an age discrimination disparate impact claim. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. 228, 242 (2005). Although Smith is an age discrimination disparate impact case
relating to the disparate impact of a raise policy on younger verses older employees, the
rationale of granting deference to the employer’s business judgment about salary setting
may be applicable to Title VII disparate impact wage discrimination jurisprudence.
114. Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for
Assessing When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CAL. L. REV. 669 (2007).
115. Id. at 669.
116. Id. at 672.
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because the non-graduates are less productive, but solely because
these employees have fewer employment alternatives than highschool graduates. For example, imagine that non-graduates were
more tied to their hometown than graduates and hence had fewer
work alternatives. I will call this the market power defense,
because the lower pay is a function of the employer's greater
market power over the non-graduates. Note that both of these
defenses are, at core, about profitability. The productivity
defense in essence says that the policy enhances the firm's
profitability because the employer will be more profitable if it is
not forced to pay workers more than their marginal productivity.
A firm that pays less productive workers the same as more
productive workers will tend to be unprofitable. But the market
power defense is also about profitability, because finding a group
of workers who will work for a sub-competitive wage is also an
effective way for a firm to increase its profits.117
From a normative policy perspective, Ayres may be right that the
“business necessity” defense should be scrutinized more closely to
ascertain what type of profitability argument the employer is promoting.
When the employer is claiming the market enables him to extract a larger
share of the contractual surplus from one group of employees than from
another for the same work (in our case – extracting more from women on
average than from men) this should fall outside the boundaries of a
business necessity defense. Regrettably, this approach has yet to be
implemented in Title VII disparate impact litigation, where it is quite clear
that profit-enhancement justifications are treated with deference.
Nonetheless, as I discuss in section IV.D, Ayres’s distinctions are easier to
implement in the EPA framework.
A summary of my concerns about the prospects of disparate impact
law to serve as a gatekeeper against employer market based justifications of
gender pay disparity would go thus: disparate impact law requires the
analysis of statistical data to establish the correlation between specific
employment practices and wage levels across gender lines. The law
requires the data be firm specific, necessitating both expertise and
resources, which make such an analysis economically infeasible in many
cases brought by individuals. Even if the initial burden of demonstrating
statistical disparate impact is met, courts often defer to employers’
explanations of business needs and profit maximizing behavior, which fall
neatly within current interpretation of the business necessity defense.
Lurking in the background are at least two remarks by the Supreme Court
that disparate impact analysis is unavailable in gender wage discrimination
cases.
117. Id. at 672-73.
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IV. THE PARTIAL CAUSATION MODEL FOR WAGE DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS

A. Initial Justification for a Partial Causation Model
Embedded in Title VII theory of discrimination is a causal link
between group membership and adverse treatment of group members.118
This concept of discrimination impedes the ability to combat discrimination
when such causation is unverifiable or too complex. Ascertaining which
factors contribute to disparity in compensation between two similarly
situated employees is one such case. Absent direct evidence that the
employer intentionally took gender into consideration when setting wages
(the Corning Glass scenario), and especially if the employer insists that
market constraints or opportunities warranted paying one employee who
happened to be male more than his female colleague, the causation model
is of limited use. In theory, resorting to disparate impact analysis, we can
go about weeding out which factors correlate with gender and thus meet the
causation requirement, but in practice, this is usually impossible.
Sex discrimination is treating people differently on the basis of their
gender. The causation model opts to prove discrimination by requiring the
plaintiff to present evidence of causation – how the prohibited factor (sex)
directly or indirectly affected the decision. The model emphasizes the need
to show how the irrelevant factor, gender, found its way into the decisionmaking process.
Another way to define gender discrimination is by focusing on
whether the employer has used relevant factors in setting pay. The
policymaker identifies the range of pertinent factors for determining
compensation. Any wage disparity between men and women that cannot
be explained by one or more of these legitimate factors is deemed as a
matter of law a manifestation of gender discrimination. One way to legally
formulate this concept of discrimination is to institute an irrebuttable
presumption of discrimination when an employer cannot offer an
explanation that meets one of those authorized reasons. Any other basis for
the disparity, if not on the list of qualified explanations, is rejected and the
fact finder must conclude that sex discrimination has tainted the decisionmaking process. The difference between the two frameworks can be
articulated as follows: the traditional model is formulated as a negative
command “sex is an irrelevant factor”. It permits broad discretion;
allowing the decision maker to base his decision on infinite grounds,
restricted only by gender based decisions. The proposed model is

118. Kelman, supra note 75.
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structured around a positive command “you can base your decision only on
an authorized list of factors”.
Application of the market defense to these two frameworks can
exemplify their divergence. In the traditional framework the market
argument aims to show that the employer based his decision on some factor
other than sex. The relevance of that other factor is not closely scrutinized.
Under the proposed model, the market explanation must be examined to
see whether it falls within the scope of the relevant factors. The defense
will only be established if it is determined that the specifics of the market
justification are in fact relevant to wage determination. Under this regime
the ability to justify wage disparities with market based arguments is
bounded by a relevancy test.
The traditional model of defining discrimination by irrelevant factors
has at least three strong justifications. First, it safeguards the actor’s
freedom. Restrictions are placed on the employer only in the prohibited
zone; any other motivations, frivolous or irrational, are not subject to
review. Second, it is assumed that it is an easier task to identify what are
the wrong reasons to reach a certain decision, than to compile a complete
list of the “good reasons.” The risk of making an error is higher when we
are required to compile a conclusive list of relevant inputs than when we
are only committed to make sure that the factors on our “bad list” are
indeed irrelevant and socially harmful. The possibility that there are
additional unidentified harmful motives does not derogate the task, since
the focus is on particular wrongs – making sure that those already
identified are regulated. Later the list of irrelevant factors can be
expanded, as was the experience with employment anti-discrimination
mandates, expanding its reach from the initial five core categories of race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin to issues such as age based
discrimination, disability and pregnancy. Lastly, if our objective is to
combat discrimination, especially discrimination based on group
membership, the negative definition framework seems to provide a natural
fit. It accomplishes what it set out to do: weeding out only practices or
decisions that are based on group membership. On the other hand,
following the relevant factor list may result in interfering with decisions
that are not motivated or affected by group membership considerations.
The relevant-factor definition of discrimination has its advantages too.
Assuming we want to control only decisions based on group membership,
turning to this definition may advance this goal. When the decisionmaking process is complex and based on multiple factors, or subjective
decentralized evaluations, filtering it through a comprehensive checklist of
authorized factors may prove beneficial.119 The traditional model raises the

119. This proposal stems from a similar understanding of the complexity of workplace
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question whether group membership played a role in the decision-making,
but the answer in many cases is usually inconclusive. We don’t know, and
therefore our understanding is that the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion has
not been met. The law has developed evidentiary presumptions and tools
to aid a plaintiff in meeting his causation burden. Both disparate treatment
law and disparate impact law have moved in this direction.120 But at the
end of the day, as the market defense has proven all too well, the causation
requirement effectively precludes liability in these complex multicomponent cases, enabling employers to evade liability in some cases
where causation to group membership is present, but cannot be isolated and
verified among the myriad factors contributing to the decision. On the
other hand, the relevant-factors approach keeps things simple. Once the
decision maker fails to show that he was guided by the authorizing factors,
he is liable. Liability attaches even in cases when he can point to other
factors, not on the list, which have no known statistical correlation with
membership in the protected group.
Applying the traditional model will result in false negatives. Some
decisions are sanctioned, although they are based on group membership, in
the disparate treatment or disparate impact sense. Causation may exist in
fact but not be detected due to information and verification problems or the
complexity of the causal link between some factors known to affect the
decision and membership in the protected group. Turning to the positive
definition model will lead to false positives. Some decisions will be
deemed discriminatory, since the decision-maker relied on factors not on

decision-making that is driving a growing number of scholars to recommend that employers
adopt structured processes and protocols to self regulate their compliance with Title VII.
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) (proposing a structural regulatory solution to
second generation employment discrimination); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 91 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace
in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 366-372 (2005). The structural
approach is an attempt to improve compliance with anti-discrimination mandates in
situations we fear that the employer is perhaps engaging in unconscious bias and
discrimination. Instituting self evaluation and prophylactic measures is presumed to
decrease the risk of the employer unconsciously and unintentionally reaching unlawful
discriminatory decisions. The difference between my proposal and the structural approach
is that the latter builds on establishing process and procedures to de-bias the institution from
its unconscious discriminatory practices. Yet the structural approach is still focused on
causation. Process is established to make sure, as a prophylactic measure, that prohibited
considerations are not part of the decision-making process.
120. In disparate treatment law, the landmark decision of McDonnell Douglas v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), established the four prong prima facie case (PFC) for an individual
disparate treatment case and articulated the burden of production the employer carries to
answer the PFC. In disparate impact, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the various
stages and burden of persuasion shifting, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
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the affirmative list, but these factors have no underlying causal links to
membership in the protected group.121 Given that both models have their
costs, the question is which model is ultimately more beneficial.
As a starting point, one should always turn to the traditional model.
But in cases where there is growing confirmation of its failure to identify
discrimination, serious consideration should be given to switching to the
relevant-factors model. In other words, if there is suspicion that too many
false negatives are occurring, the traditional model is ineffective in
achieving its goal of eliminating group-based discrimination. The second
qualification for considering the relevant-factors model is the confidence
that a policymaker has in its ability to identify many pertinent factors. If
the affirmative list is comprised of the majority of appropriate grounds, this
decreases the chance that there will be false positive determinations of
discrimination.
The endeavor to eliminate the gender wage gap is an area of
discrimination law where we should start questioning the effectiveness of
the traditional model. The gender wage gap remains a persistent barrier to
sex equality in the workplace. The average earnings of women working
full time is still around twenty percent less than the average earnings of
men holding a full time job.122 The wage gap has not diminished in any
meaningful way in the past decade.123 Section II outlined circumstances
where the causation model failed to identify gender-based compensation
schemes. The failure was not due to a lack of understanding of how to
apply the causation model. The failure was imminent due to the structural
constraints of the traditional framework. Given the complexity of how
gender and sex correlate with other social factors such as negotiation skills,
mobility, career expectations, social norms, and various other issues we
121. One such false positive case is when the disparity in compensation is due to changes
over time in the demand or supply of employees in an industry, profession, or geographical
area as was the case in Ciardella v. Carson City School District, 671 F. Supp. 699 (D. Nev.
1987) (showing that due to economic changes in the job market, the employer was required
to extend an offer of compensation of approximately $10,000 more per year than the
plaintiff was receiving while performing the same job). In these situations, there is no
underlying, unidentified statistical correlation between the temporal market conditions and
the sex of the workers hired at the different points in time. But since market conditions are
not listed on the affirmative list, an employer maybe found liable. In these situations, the
positive definitions of discrimination entail costs.
122. In the first quarter of 2009, women who worked full time had median earnings of
$649 per week, or 78.9 percent of the $823 median for men. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, USDL 09-1242, Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary
(2009),
available
at
Workers:
First
Quarter
2009
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf.
123. In 1998, women earned about 76 percent as much as men. The median weekly
earnings of female fulltime wage and salary workers were $456 compared to $598 for men.
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 928, Highlights of Women’s
Earnings in 1998, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom98.pdf.
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have not even begun to think about, the causation model lets too many of
these factors escape meaningful review. The result is too many false
negatives, errors that keep feeding the gender wage gap.
Implementing the relevant-factors model cannot solely be based on a
high rate of false negatives. Equally important is the consideration of
whether policymakers are capable of ascertaining the appropriate factors.
This is an essential prerequisite, needed to ensure that unnecessary or
unfair restrictions are not placed on the decision maker’s discretion.
Compensation determinations meet this perquisite. We can ascertain that
compensation should somehow correlate with the job or task being
preformed and individual productivity. We can state that employees
performing the same job, under similar conditions, with equal productivity
should be compensated similarly. How we classify the “sameness” of jobs
or working conditions and how to exactly measure productivity is
debatable. But this is an issue where we have an initial agreement of what
are the relevant factors.124
B. Is The Equal Pay Act a Partial Causation Model?
The Equal Pay Act consists of two parts. The first part, the prima
facie case (PFC), sets out the criteria for determining which jobs are
deemed equal and warrant equal pay to employees of opposite genders.
The PFC elements are that an employer pays: (1) different wages (2)
within the same establishment (3) to employees of opposing sexes (4) for
equal work on jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility and
which are preformed under similar working conditions. The second part of
the EPA lists the four affirmative defenses: (i) a seniority system; (ii) a
merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
production, or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
Once the plaintiff establishes her PFC, the burden of persuasion shifts to
the defendant employer to show the disparity is caused by one of the four
affirmative defenses.125
The PFC’s fourth element focuses on general attributes of the jobs
compared, making sure that the positions are “equal,” in essence, requiring
124. Guaranteeing reduction in false positive rates requires restrictive definitions of what
qualifies as equal work and what qualifies as equal productivity.
125. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1974) (“[W]hile the Act is
silent on this question, its structure and history also suggest that once the Secretary has
carried his burden of showing that the employer pays workers of one sex more than workers
of the opposite sex for equal work, the burden shifts to the employer to show that the
differential is justified under one of the Act's four exceptions. All of the many lower courts
that have considered this question have so held, and this view is consistent with the general
rule that the application of an exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act is a matter of
affirmative defense on which the employer has the burden of proof.”).
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equal skill effort and responsibility and performed under similar working
conditions. It is the plaintiff’s burden to present the case for this general
equivalence. The affirmative defense shifts the focus to individual
differences between two or more people performing “equal work.”
Basically what the employer is arguing, when raising one of the four
affirmative defenses, is that although the plaintiff and the comparator (the
individual whom the plaintiff is comparing herself to) are performing the
same job, they are not entitled to equal compensation due to differences in
their individual performance or work history. Seniority, merit, and quantity
based earnings all relate to individual attributes of specific individuals.
The PFC of the EPA certainly deviates from the causation model. A
plaintiff neither has to show that the employer took into account her sex
when determining compensation, nor does she have to demonstrate the
disparate impact of the employer’s practice on women as a group. The
omission of causation in the PFC makes the EPA accessible to individual
employees. One does not need extraordinary resources to argue, “I am
performing the same job, in the same establishment, but being paid less
than comparable men.” The plaintiff does not have to offer any theory or
evidence of causation between her sex and her lower compensation. She
just has to present factual evidence that she is being paid less than a male
co-worker performing the same job. The PFC stage relies on a relevancy
test only. It takes pain to detail the relevant factors such as working in the
same establishment, equal work, equal skill, effort and responsibility, and
work under the same working conditions. All these factors are related to
productivity. Making sure that the plaintiff and the comparator are
performing jobs that have the potential of generating the same productivity
is central in modeling employer decision-making.
The affirmative defense stage turns to the issue of individual
productivity. If the plaintiff is successful in meeting her burden of
persuasion to show the jobs are potentially equal (can generate the same
output from the employer’s perspective), the employer can argue that pay
differentials are due to individual variations in the performance of the
plaintiff and the comparator. The three specific affirmative defenses
authorize pay systems based on seniority, merit, or production. All three
reference factors that proxy individual productivity. It is assumed that
more experience (seniority), more training or credentials (merit), and
contributing more production (production) enhance an individual’s
productivity. These three defenses fall squarely in the relevancy model,
encompassing factors that are relevant to pay variations.
The fourth defense, “any other factor other than sex” (AFOTS), poses
a serious challenge to my argument that the EPA is a partial causation
model of discrimination. The AFOTS defense uses language associated
with the causation model. “Any other factor other than sex,” sounds
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equivalent to a mandate prohibiting only decisions that are driven by sexbased motivations. It suggests that any non-sex based factor is an
acceptable justification for gender wage disparity. I think that normatively
(if not linguistically), this is a wrong reading of the AFOTS defense. If any
factor other than sex could justify pay disparity, this would make the three
specific defenses redundant. Why mention merit, seniority, or individual
production if all three fall in the catchall exemption of “any other factor?”
A better interpretation of AFOTS is that the catchall exemption references
only to explanations that correlate with productivity, as long as they are not
tainted by intentional sex discrimination. If AFOTS is interpreted in this
limited fashion, the EPA is an application of the partial causation model of
discrimination. It does not require the plaintiff to demonstrate causation
between her sex and lower compensation, and it does not relieve an
employer of liability by severing causation between sex and compensation.
Looking at the mandate as a whole, it can be summarized as requiring the
employer to provide productive workers of opposite sex, who are
performing the same job, with equal pay. Whenever an employer deviates
from this mandate he is deemed discriminatory, even if there is no
indication that he was motivated by sex based considerations or that the
factors he relied on adversely impact women as a group.
C. Why Was The Equal Pay Act Interpreted as a Causation Model?
EPA jurisprudence has not indicated any willingness to deviate from
the traditional understanding of what constitutes sex discrimination and the
centrality of the causation model. This can be displayed by the treatment
of the market defense. A conflict among the Circuits exists with regards to
the proper contours of the catchall affirmative defense, “any factor other
than sex” (AFOTS). The Supreme Court has resisted settling this
conflict.126
In the conservative camp, the Eighth Circuit led the way in Strecker v.
Grand Forks County Social Service Board,127 holding that any
determination by an employer that he established a neutral pay system
qualifies as “any other factor other than sex.”128 The Seventh Circuit
followed suit in Wernsing v. Department of Human Services,129 where a
female employee challenged the practice of basing compensation on

126. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Aldrich, 506 U.S. 965 (1992).
127. 640 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1980).
128. Another 8th Circuit decision affirming the Strecker’s standard is Taylor v. White,
321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[w]e ‘do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions . . . .’ As such we are reluctant to establish a per se
rule that might chill the legitimate use of gender-neutral policies and practices.”).
129. 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005).
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previous salaries of lateral hiring because it resulted in substantially
different pay for male and female employees. The Seventh Circuit stated
that the EPA only “asks whether the employer has a reason other than sex-not whether it has a ’good’ reason.”130
The broad interpretation of the AFOTS defense transforms the EPA
into a disparate treatment only model of discrimination (not allowing
consideration of disparate impact).131 Since the employer can justify his
pay decisions by any non-sex factor, endeavors like those of the plaintiff in
Wernsing to show how the challenged practice affected women’s
compensation are futile. The EPA under this interpretation regulates only
intentional sex based compensation decisions. The Eight and Seventh
Circuits' reading of the EPA, especially the AFOTS defense, leaves no
doubt that they did not acknowledge any innovative understanding of what
are unlawful wage practices. This understanding is grounded deep within
the causation model, limited to conventional intentional disparate
treatment.
Other Circuits are more open-minded about scrutinizing employers’
market based explanation for wage disparity. Probably the most cited
example is the Ninth Circuit decision in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co.132
In that case, the plaintiff argued that her employer’s practice of using prior
salaries to determine compensation was discriminatory because it resulted
in the average female sales agent being paid less than her average male
counterpart. When considering possible interpretations to the AFOTS
defense, the court rejected the two extreme options: one that would enable
the employer to evade liability by showing he relied on any factor other
than the employee’s sex. This interpretation was dismissed since
employers can manipulate factors having close correlation to gender.133
The second interpretation rejected is one that would deny employers the
opportunity to use acceptable factors, if it perpetuates historic sex
discrimination.134 Instead the court required that the employer show that
the pay system was based on an "acceptable business reason."135 The Sixth
Circuit also incorporated the "acceptable business reason" limitation into
the AFOTS defense. In EEOC v. J.C Penney Co., it reasoned, “The ‘factor
130. Id. at 468.
131. Id. at 469 (“An analogy to disparate-impact litigation under Title VII does not
justify a ‘business reason’ requirement under the Equal Pay Act, however, because the
Equal Pay Act deals exclusively with disparate treatment. It does not have a disparateimpact component.”).
132. 692 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
133. Id. at 876.
134. Id.
135. Id. at n.6 (declining to articulate what falls within the standard of “acceptable
business reason” leaving the compiling of a list of unacceptable reasons or a more concise
formulation of the standard to “another day”.).
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other than sex’ defense does not include literally any other factor, but a
factor that at a minimum, was adopted for a legitimate business reason.” 136
The Eleventh Circuit followed suit in Glenn v. General Motors Corp.
adopting the reasonable business reason standard when reviewing the
employer’s explanation that to encourage people to move out of hourly
wage jobs into salaried tracks, it established a policy against requiring an
employee to take a cut in pay, and that this policy, and not the sex of the
employees, was the cause of the pay disparity between men and women.137
Rejecting this explanation the court stated that “[t]he legislative history
thus indicates that the ‘factor other than sex’ exception applies when the
disparity results from unique characteristics of the same job; from an
individual's experience, training, or ability; or from special exigent
circumstances connected with the business. The pay disparity at issue here
does not result from any of these reasons.”138 Finally, the Second Circuit in
Aldrich v. Central School District, asserted that “we believe that Congress
specifically rejected blanket assertions of facially-neutral job classification
systems as valid factor-other-than-sex defenses to EPA claims.” 139 It
required the employer to prove that a bona fide business-related reason
exists for the gender neutral factor that resulted in wage differentials.140
The “acceptable business reason” limitation of the AFOTS defense
does not convert the EPA into a partial causation model of sex
discrimination. The line of decisions which require the employer to offer
an acceptable business reason for his pay practices simply incorporate a
variance of disparate impact into the EPA,141 in contrast to the more
conservative circuits which permit only disparate treatment type claims. In
essence, what the courts are saying is that in cases where the plaintiff meets
her PFC, we require the employer to explain why his pay scheme, which
resulted in the plaintiff being paid less than her male co-workers for equal
work, is sound from a business perspective. In spirit, this is analogous to
the “business necessity” defense. The “acceptable business reason”
standard leaves employers with more latitude than the “business necessity”
standard, which is constrained by the accumulative requirements of

136. EEOC v. J.C Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 253 (6th Cir. 1998).
137. 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988).
138. Id. at 1571.
139. 963 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 526.
141. This is also how the Wernsing court characterizes the Kouba standard. “Kouba,
which originated the ‘acceptable business reason’ requirement, did not explain its genesis; it
was advanced as ukase. The ninth circuit proceeded as if the Equal Pay Act worked like the
disparate-impact theory under Title VII: if the plaintiff shows that an employment practice
adversely affects protected workers as a group, then the employer must provide a strong
reason (‘business necessity’) for the practice.” Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427
F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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showing both job relatedness to the position in question and business
necessity. It is hard to envision the “acceptable business reason” standard
as invigorating a relevancy-based model of discrimination because it
requires only cursory review of the business soundness of pay practices
resulting in lower wages for women workers, without further guidance that
these justifications must relate only to productivity concerns.
Why are the courts resisting the partial causation model? First and
foremost, any relevancy-based theory of discrimination is antithetical to the
historical and cultural basis of employment discrimination law in the
United States. If jurists, litigators, and judges are educated and trained to
conceptualize discrimination only as basing decisions on prohibited factors
such as race or sex, it is extremely difficult to make the mental leap to the
relevancy definition, which asks whether the decision was based only on
relevant factors. It is inevitable that with this indoctrination the disposition
is to construct the EPA as a traditional anti-discrimination mandate. But
there are also at least three linguistic foundations within the language of
both the EPA and Title VII that may have contributed to this interpretation.
First, whether you apply a broad or narrow interpretation, the AFOTS
defense uses language associated with the causation model. It suggests that
any non-sex-based factor is an acceptable justification for gender wage
disparity. This linguistic reading certainly influenced the Seventh and
Eight Circuits’ understanding of AFOTS defense.
The Bennett
Amendment also contributes to the application of the causation model
within the EPA. Although merely a coordination clause, which the
objective was to clarify that employment practices authorized by the EPA
shall not be considered a violation of Title VII, the Bennett Amendment
was implicitly comprehended as bridging the gap between the two statutes,
and partially unifying them to one body of law with respect to sex-based
compensation discrimination.142 If the two statutes are interrelated, then
one theory of discrimination, the causation model, should govern them
both. This conclusion is not warranted by the Bennett Amendment. It is a
one-way coordination clause, restricting only Title VII by the EPA and not
vice versa. Actually, if the premise is that the EPA and Title VII are
virtually the same, there would be no need for a coordination clause. It is
only when we recognize existing differences between the theory and
elements of liability that a coordination mechanism is meaningful. The last
linguistic hint of a causation model is the opening proviso of the EPA: “No
employer . . . shall discriminate . . . on the basis of sex.”143 This language
could also be understood as embracing the Title VII causation model. The
142. The court acknowledged that there are variations between the two statutes in the
prima facie case and the scope of the employer’s defense, but they do not consider these
differences to be foundational. Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
143. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
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proviso, however, should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the
causation model. The following sentence, the substantive part of the EPA,
immediately explains what it means in the context of the EPA to
discriminate in terms of pay on the basis of sex, resorting to the relevancy
model. The proviso is simply a term that is followed by its definition.
Normative considerations are also important. Parting from the
causation model in favor of a relevancy test carries with it hefty limitations
on managerial discretion in setting individual wage rates. It is feared that it
will result in the elimination of differential pay altogether, as employers
will constantly worry about employees coming forward with claims of pay
inequality. Under a relevancy test, the burden to justify the pay scheme is
substantially heavier than under the irrelevancy test, where you simply
have to convince the fact-finder that sex considerations did not taint your
decision-making process. The conflict among the circuit courts about the
proper interpretation of the AFOTS defense can be explained by the
discrepancy among the circuits regarding the latitude employers should
have in constructing their pay schemes. The conservative camp shields
employers from any intervention with managerial discretion beyond
intentionally sex-based decisions, while Kouba and its progeny place some
restrictions on employers, but only on the outskirts.144 Shifting to a partial
causation model takes a significant step forward in regulatory intervention,
since any justification is screened against strict productivity-enhancing
criteria. It should be clear that even under the strict standard, there is still
ample room for individual differentiation (based on productivity
considerations).
D. Can the Partial Causation Model be Resurrected within the Equal Pay
Act?
Absent legislative amendments clarifying the structure of the EPA by
highlighting the foundational differences from Title VII jurisprudence, it is
unlikely the relevancy-based model of discrimination will be implemented.
As illustrated, all of the federal circuits that have interpreted the EPA
AFOTS defense share an implicit understanding that causation is the core
issue of liability. Nonetheless, I think that one can build on the existing
“acceptable business reason” advanced in Kouba and its progeny to
emulate a paradigm that operates fairly similarly to the relevancy test.
Although the theoretical foundation will be lacking, the end result would be
satisfactory.
The “acceptable business reason” is a standard of review that

144. These decisions only accomplish in broadening the EPA to include disparate impact
type claims. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
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scrutinizes the employer’s explanation for wage disparities. It currently
provides employers considerable leeway, only ensuring that the employer’s
explanation is not hiding traditional sex discrimination. A similar outcome
to fully implementing a relevancy test can be achieved by heightening
scrutiny on employers, and requiring them to detail and substantiate their
claims with facts and data supporting their contention that productivity
enhancement is the underlying basis for the pay disparity.
Here, we can draw on Ayres’ proposal to distinguish between general
profitability claims and specific claims pertaining to productivity.145 I have
questioned the prospect of applying this important insight to Title VII’s
“business necessity” defense, but I am more optimistic of implementing it
through the EPA AFOTS defense. Title VII is more of a market-driven
statute than the EPA. The EPA is incorporated into the Fair Labor
Standard Act of 1938 (“FLSA”).146 The central purpose of the FLSA is to
secure minimum wage and overtime pay to covered employees, and to
place restrictions on child labor.147 These provisions are all anti-market
measures. Regulations on minimum wage, overtime, and child labor all
spur from an ideology that sometimes market outcomes are either
inefficient or inequitable, even if they enhance profitability. The FLSA is
about regulating market pressures, and the quest of employers to extract
profits. In this statutory environment it is easier to explain why not all
profit-maximizing behavior should be authorized. It is thus feasible to
apply Ayres’ distinction between profits sustained through depressing
wages of one group of employee, which is not a valid “acceptable business
reason,” and profits gained through applying a policy that increases
productivity, which is acceptable.148
In summary, the EPA can be salvaged. Meeting the PFC will require
the employer to provide a productivity rationale for his general
compensation system or for specific productivity variance between the
plaintiff and her comparator. The failure to offer productivity related
rationales will give rise, as a matter of law, to an irrebuttable presumption
that the disparity is “because of sex.” This framework preserves the
causation model as the theoretical foundation of the EPA, but for all
practical matters relieves the plaintiff of the need to point to causation
either through disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis. Under this
proposal, carrying the burden of the EPA prima facie case will establish a
substantially stronger inference of discrimination than under Title VII
discrimination claims.

145. Ayres, supra note 114.
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
147. Id.
148. Ayres, Market Power and Inequality, supra note 114.
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E. The Paycheck Fairness Act
The best prospect for implementing a partial causation model within
the EPA is the Paycheck Fairness Act.149 The bill is an amendment to the
EPA, and is currently pending in the Senate after passing in the House of
Representatives. Section 3 revises the AFOTS defense by limiting its
application only to differentials based on “a bona fide factor other than sex,
such as education, training, or experience.”150 The bona fide factor defense
applies only if the employer demonstrates that such a factor: (i) is not
based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation; (ii) is
job-related with respect to the position in question; and (iii) is consistent
with business necessity.151 The defense does not apply where the employee
demonstrates that: (1) an alternative employment practice exists that would
serve the same business purpose without producing such differential; and
(2) the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice.152
The Paycheck Fairness Act includes other important provisions such
as expanded retaliation protection that covers inquiries and disclosure of
information about wages;153 strengthened remedies, including
compensatory and punitive damages;154 requiring the EEOC to provide
training on issues pertaining wage discrimination;155 and authorizing the
Secretary of Labor to make grants to programs providing negotiation skills
training for girls and women, and to conduct studies and provide
information regarding the means available to eliminate pay disparities
between men and women.156
This bill addresses many of the barriers to gender pay equality
discussed in this Article, including the significant impact of lack of
information and negotiation skills on the wages of women. The new
catchall exception is substantially narrower. First, it applies only to a bona
fide factor.157 Second, examples follow the general principle listing
education, training, and experience, all issues relevant to productivity.
There is no mention of any market justifications or sheer profit

149. Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-12.
150. Id. at § 3(a)(2).
151. Id. at § 3(a)(3).
152. Id.
153. Id. at § 3(b).
154. Id. at § 3(c).
155. Id. at § 4.
156. Id. at §§ 5, 6, and 9.
157. The bona fide requirement was implicitly incorporated in the existing interpretation
of the AFOTS. None of the circuits interpreting the AFOTS defense alluded to the
possibility that they will not review a claim that the defense served as a subterfuge for
intentional discrimination.
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maximization arguments. Third, any defense would be scrutinized under
the equivalent of the Title VII “business necessity” standard.158 One should
note that the “business necessity” standard is applicable only to
productivity justifications-– those factors that are listed as examples of the
AFOTS, such as education, training, and experience. This would bar all
non-productivity factors, and subject productivity-related factors to the
additional scrutiny of the “business necessity” standard.159
Although the proposal incorporates Title VII “business necessity”
language, it is not a revival of disparate impact theory within the EPA. The
bill does not require the plaintiff to offer evidence that the scrutinized
factor disparately impacts women, nor does it limit its application to any
factor. The adoption of the “business necessity” standard is limited in
scope. Only justifications such as those listed as examples of legitimate
factors are subject to “business necessity” scrutiny. All other explanations,
including market-based justifications are dismissed a priori, without
“business necessity” scrutiny. The structure of the amended AFOTS
defense is a true manifestation of a partial causation model of
discrimination. It takes pain in explaining what counts as a legitimate
factor to make compensation decisions: a productivity-related explanation
that fulfills the business necessity requirement. The bill implicitly states
that, as a matter of law, sex discrimination is established when gender pay
disparities are the outcome of utilizing a criteria not authorized by the
statute.
V. CONCLUSION
When discussing my ideas about pay equality with colleagues and
friends, I am usually confronted by one of three reactions. The skeptical
want to know how it is possible that an employer can pay two equally
productive workers different wages. They think that the disparate pay is
the ultimate proof that these two workers are not equally productive. If
indeed they are equally productive, a profit-maximizing employer should
opt for hiring only employees willing to work for the lower wages, leading
to a new equilibrium where again all workers with equal productivity are
compensated at the same wage rate. The skeptical also make the argument
158. The Act uses almost identical language to the definition of “business necessity”
defense of Title VII. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
159. Section 3(a)(3)(B) of the bill states that “[t]he bona fide factor defense described in
subparagraph A (iv) [the AFOTS] shall apply only if the employer demonstrates” business
necessity. Paycheck Fairness Act, supra note 131, at § 3(a)(3)(B). I read this to mean that
the employer has to meet two accumulative conditions. First, he has to identify the bona
fide factor other than sex, which is limited only to productivity issues such as education,
training, and experience. In addition, he has to demonstrate that these factors meet the
“business necessity standard” of Title VII. This is a very strict standard.
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that negotiation skills are relevant vocational abilities, which enhance the
performance of employees. The libertarians are worried about managerial
discretion and the ability under my thesis to actually implement deferential
pay based on individual merit and productivity. They fear employers will
react by instituting rigid pay schedules, similar to the ones in the unionized
sector. These pay schemes will undermine productivity because they will
curtail any individual incentive to excel and work hard. The enthusiasts
want more; they inquire where else can the model of partial causation be
applied? They support the idea of relevancy checklists to combat
discrimination.
The response to the skeptical is threefold. The formal answer is that
the partial causation model does not have any qualms with employers that
argue that the plaintiff and the comparator are not equally productive. This
is precisely what the model wants the employer to come forward and say.
The model applies only if the employer insists on raising non-productivity
claims, implicitly conceding that in terms of productivity, the workers are
equal. For example, an employer can justify pay disparity if he argues that
negotiation skills are a good proxy for future performance on the job. This
may be true in specific professions and positions, but not across the board.
This transforms the market argument into an ability criterion which is
legitimate if the employer successfully presents evidence of a productivity
enhancing attribute.160 But it is not good enough for the employer to only
justify the disparity by arguing he was not forced by market constraints to
raise the wage of the female employee.
Why do employers keep hiring the higher paid individuals when they
can hire equally productive employees for lower wages? In some
industries and occupations, this is exactly what is happening, resulting in a
labor market segregated across gender lines. The partial causation model
does not apply to comparable worth claims. In industries and occupations
where the supply of individuals willing to work for lower wages does not
meet the aggregate demand, if given the chance the employer will engage
in wage discrimination, paying individuals willing to work for lower wages
their reservation wage, and filling the remaining vacancies with individuals
demanding higher pay.161 With the current economic meltdown, there are
160. The fact that some women are as effective as men when negotiating on behalf of
third parties should be taken into account when an employer raises the argument that
promotion of self-interest in pay bargaining is a relevant trait to the job in question.
161. See DAVID CARD & ALAN B. KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE (Princeton University Press 1995) (Questioning the
assumption that competition drives employers to pay all employees within one industry or
regional area a “market rate.” Some employers are able to attract employees at below
market rates, but supply of these below market wage employees does not meet demand.
The authors argue that a small increase in the minimum wage will not necessarily result in
higher unemployment rates, since mandating employers to pay higher wages through
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reports that men are disproportionally the victims of layoffs, while the
female unemployment rate has been increasing at a slower rate.162 Layoff
decisions are keyed to labor costs and individuals with a higher pay
productivity ratio, disproportionally men, are targeted. This supports my
argument that employers are in fact sustaining workforces with equally
productive workers, performing the same work, for different pay.
The libertarians’ concerns are well-grounded. If you care more about
managerial autonomy than sex equality, you should not endorse partial
causation. But libertarians should acknowledge that sticking with the
causation model comes at a price. Many sex-based compensation decisions
fly under the radar. Applying partial causation will curb managerial
discretion, but it will also preserve the most important aspect of managerial
discretion: to design compensation schemes that promote productivity. It
will force management and human resource professionals to sit down and
engage in serious deliberation and data analysis to identify factors and payincentive mechanisms that actually increase productivity. Advocating for
partial causation is not equivalent to advocating for rank-based
compensation. To the contrary, it is about consciously tying individual pay
to individual productivity.
To the enthusiasts, I can only reply, “I don’t know.” I have identified
a special case, a specific area of discrimination law in which applying a
relevancy test makes sense. This is an area where traditional legal tools are
of limited service. Pay inequality is an issue too important to be left
untreated. After all, the essence of the employment relationship is work
performed in consideration for pay. The overwhelming majority of
individuals participating in the paid labor market do so to earn a living and
to support themselves and their families. We have to make sure they are
not being underpaid due to unfair and unlawful sex discrimination.

minimum wage regulation will enable them to fill vacancies that existed when the employer
paid below market rates that were above the minimum wage.).
162. See Barbara Hagenbaugh, Men Losing Jobs at Higher Rate Than Women in
TODAY,
Jan.
12,
2009,
available
at
Recession,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-01-11-unemployment-rate-sexes_N.htm
(“In the year since the recession began in December 2007, the jobless rate for men rose from
4.4% to 7.2%. At the same time, the jobless rate for women rose from 4.3% to 5.9%.”).
Some attribute the differences in the rising unemployment rates as caused by the segregated
labor market. For example, female occupations such as those in the health and education
industries were more insulated to layoffs than male occupations in the construction and
manufacturing industries. Id.

